1 will hold its tenth regular meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe. After twenty-two years in force, the treaty stands at a crossroads -and in the focus of global debate on the future relationship between trade and environment. The present analysis will attempt to review the past performance of the CITES regime, assess its innovative contributions to international law in the field of sustainable development, and consider its prospects for growth.
of the trade is South-to-North, mainly driven by consumer demand from affluent developed countries and their profitable fashion and food industries as well as by users of rare animals and plants for medical/pharmaceutical research, exhibition or collection purposes. 3 A characteristic feature of the trade is its luxury orientation, in response to consumption patterns often ranging from the non-essential to the perverse. 4 While exports of wildlife and wildlife products are thus a significant source of foreign currency revenue for a number of countries, especially in the Third World, unsustainable rates of harvesting have led to serious depletion and, in a growing number of cases, exhaustion of the particular resource. Wildlife species are indeed renewable natural resources but, like many 'flow resources', they have a critical level below which a decrease in reproduction capacity becomes virtually irreversible 5 -even though artificial conservation measures (such as captive breeding in zoological gardens or propagation in botanical centres) may still postpone the moment of biological extinction. 6 The need to prevent extinction can be justified scientifically as well as economically, but ultimately depends on ethical (anthropocentric or biocentric) value judgements. Man-made risks to the survival of wild fauna and flora are well" documented and monitored, especially in the Red Data Books compiled since 1966 by the Species Survival Commission of the World Conservation Union (IUCN). 8 Commercial exploitation for trade is not, of course, the only cause of wildlife depletion. Destruction of natural habitats is generally recognized as the single most important threat, 9 followed by the introduction of alien species. Other contributing factors include inade-quate methods of harvesting or processing that may render utilization unsustainable. 10 Hence, there is no simple mono-causal link between trade and the conservation status of a species according to its IUCN Red List category ('vulnerable', 'endangered', 'critically endangered').
1 '
By the same token, international approaches to species conservation address a wide range of issues and primarily focus on habitat protection, 12 in spite of the constraints which the 'territorial imperative' (of national sovereignty over most of the world's biological resources) 13 traditionally imposes on a regulatory regime. Yet trade was readily identified as an issue for which precautionary transnational action is both feasible and necessary -not only to avoid aggravating a multiple-cause ecological problem, but also to prevent a 'free rider' dilemma lest unilateral bans penalize individual importing 'or exporting countries vis-d-vis their less scrupulous competitors. Thus, economic concerns for the 'level playing field' in a sizeable world market also played a role in the diplomatic negotiations on a global regime for trade in endangered species. Useful to Man or Inoffensive, 14 and the 1933 London Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State. l5 Both treaties contained basic elements of a system to deal with the problem of unsustainable exploitation of wildlife, by means of hunting restrictions for threatened species listed in annexes, confiscation of ivory taken illegally, and export licensing for specified wildlife products. Exceptions were provided for scientific collection and for specimens acquired prior to the entry into force of the treaty. 16 Under the 1933 Convention, any imports of listed species required export certificates from a competent authority in the territory of origin. 17 Although still focused on harmonization of local wildlife management rules -motivated by traditional concern for the preservation of colonial big-game hunting grounds and revenuesthe regime thus extended its controls to wildlife-importing countries, and already envisaged wildlife identification manuals for customs officers (article 9/5).
II. International Response to the Problem
While the 1900 Convention never entered into force (for lack of ratification by all signatories, as required under article VIII) 18 and hence did not survive World War I, the 1933 London Convention became applicable to most of Africa. Its import restrictions were subsequently extended by Britain to Aden and India, and by the Netherlands to Indonesia. 19 Yet the treaty failed to provide for decision-making institutions and secretariat services. Consequently, proposals for implementation and adjustment formulated during two technical follow-up meetings (held in London in 1938 and at Bukavu in 1953)^° were unsuccessful and were eventually overtaken by the political events of decolonization. The first major institutional change was triggered by a financial crisis. In 1978, the UNEP Governing Council decided to phase out its funding for CITES over a four-year 'sunset' period during which the Contracting Parties were expected to take over as direct contributors for all secretariat and conference costs. 42 In order to meet the legal concerns raised by some countries, a formal amendment of article XI first had to confer financial powers on the Conference of the Parties. A special CITES trust fund was then established under UNEP auspices, with an agreed scale of contributions based on the UN scale. 43 As a result, the regime became financially selfsupporting (with a current annual budget of about $5 million), 44 'weaning' it from UNEP fund grants and, in the process, empowering it also to seek greater administrative independence. The relationship with UNEP has not been without turbulence. When the UNEP Executive Director replaced the head of the CITES secretariat in 1990, in the wake of the ivory trade crisis, 45 he ran into open conflict with the Contracting Parties. Although ostensibly settled in 1992 by a special agreement defining UNEFs duties of prior consultation in staff and financial matters, negotiations continue.
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The next institutional innovation was the establishment of subsidiary bodies, which operate between meetings of the Conference. The executive Standing Committee was set up in 1979, and four functional committees were given permanent listing of species in the CITES appendices. 53 One possible reason for the absence of institutional in-fighting at that level may also be found in the decentralization and delegation of day-to-day scientific decisions to national authorities. Pursuant to articles III and IV of the Convention, questions relating to the survival status of any species affected by the licensing process are determined by the national scientific bodies designated by each country under article DC, although the progressive codification of common scientific criteria by the CITES Conference tends to narrow down their margin of discretion.
54 A significant recent development is the emergence of new regional institutions for implementing the Convention within the European Union. The 'CITES Committee', established by EEC Council Regulation No. 3626782 of 3 December 1982, has begun to take over from the Union's Member States some of the functions previously exercised by national authorities. 55 It has been assisted since 1986 by an advisory scientific review group and since 1995 by an enforcement working group.
B. Sanctions
The Standing Committee of the CITES Conference soon became the principal instrument for new methods of collective action against non-compliance, both within and outside the regime. As article XIV(l) allows parties to take stricter domestic measures than those provided by the treaty (including complete prohibitions of trade), the Committee has in a number of cases recommended all parties to apply that article collectively -albeit temporarily -against individual countries found to be in persistent non-compliance. This procedure was used, for instance, in relation to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1985-90; Thailand in 1991-92; 56 and Italy in 1992-93. 57 In the case of the UAE, the country withdrew from the Convention in 66 and to a certain tolerable amount of deviation from full compliance. This latter is ensured through (a) a system of reservations which allows dissenting countries to 'opt out' of collective decisions on species listing, thereby retaining with regard to that species the same status as non-parties; and (b) a number of loopholes intentionally built into article VD to deal with exceptional situations, such as specimens acquired prior to the Convention's entry into force (the 'grandfather clause' already found in the 1900 London Convention).
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The opt-out system, which was more or less modelled after the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 68 initially turned out to be more of a problem than the drafters had anticipated. 69 A few countries took out massive reservations to preserve their 'free rider' status in international trade with regard to economically important species. The whalers were the first to do so (Japan, Norway, Peru, and St.Vincent and the Grenadines are the only countries to maintain CITES criteria so established to make legitimate use (including transnational shipments) of Appendix I species at agreed sustainable rates. In the process, the CITES Conference and its secretariat had to make use of innovative technical devices to ensure proper verification of origin and legal acquisition (e.g., special marking and tagging of wildlife products such as reptile hides and furskins, and of live animals by microchips). 75 Most importantly, the international allocation of export quota to selected wildlife-producing countries has become a regular item on the agenda of CITES Conference meetings. 76 These quotas were initially introduced as an exceptional measure for African ivory and leopard skins, but were later required as a condition for 'downlisting' other animal species from Appendix I to II. Together with voluntary quota for species in Appendices II and III, 77 their use is now standard practice and is actually beginning to replace the original treaty requirement of a case-by-case 'no-detriment finding' in the granting of permits, even though there is no reference to a quota system anywhere in the Convention. Nonetheless, these exceptions were subsequently agreed and accepted by the parties with a view to introducing a higher degree of flexibility, within a tolerable margin of deviance from strict treaty norms.
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D. Drawing the Line
So in a matter of two decades, the CITES regime retrofitted itself with new institutions, incentives and disincentives ('carrots' and 'sticks'), none of which were articulated in the original treaty text. 79 Did the development and use of these innovative instruments of governance contribute to making the regime effective; i.e., did they contribute to the actual achievement of its objectives? Three prominent case histories may serve to illustrate the process of problem-solving or 'fixing' that has emerged.
J. Vicuna
The first symptomatic policy dispute arose over CITES listing of the vicufia, the rarest species in the Andean lama family. Once sacred to the Incas, this animal was hunted relentlessly and almost to extinction in later centuries because of its precious 
Ivory
The second dramatic policy conflict concerned the African elephant (Loxodonta qfricana), the very species symbolized in the CITES logo. While the Asian elephant (Elephas maximus) had been protected in CITES Appendix I from the outset, the African species was initially listed in Appendix II, at a time when at least 1.3 million elephants were estimated to survive in the wild. 83 The theory was that wellestablished national programmes of wildlife management would ensure sustainability of the species as a source of tourism revenue. These programmes would become self-supporting through income from controlled hunting and from sales of legally taken ivory, which was in high demand in countries with traditional ivory-carving industries (including China, Japan, France and Germany). 84 proposed an alternative set of new 'beneficial use' categories. 98 Ultimately, the Bern catalogue was superseded by comprehensive new 'Everglades criteria' at Fort Lauderdale in 1994. While reiterating the precautionary principle, the new guidelines for listing and de-listing (which are to be reviewed again in five years' time) reaffirm the special role of the range states of particular species in the listing process. They are also more specific with regard to the biological and statistical information to be taken into account."
At the same meeting, the CITES Conference initiated an independent review of the overall effectiveness of the regime. 100 An external consultant team has been contracted to undertake the review. Issues under examination include an assessment of the Convention's objectives; the extent to which the conservation status of selected listed species has been affected in both party and non-party states; implementation and enforcement of the Convention at the national level; and the relationship of CITES to other conservation instruments. The findings and recommendations of the review, including the results of a survey of twelve selected species and of a detailed questionnaire circulated in June 1996 to all parties and international organizations associated with CITES, 101 are to be submitted to the forthcoming 1997 Conference through the Standing Committee. The review will thus serve as a 'feedback loop' for further policy-making and adjustment.
IV. Implementation
A. Legislation and Administrative Regulation
By June 1997, 135 countries will be parties to CITES, including virtually all of the 'consumers' (about 40) and 'producers' of wildlife (some countries, such as the United States and Russia, belong to both groups). As most of the Convention text is not 'self-executing', implementation requires -in addition to the formal act of ratifi- cation and promulgation in the national language -a series of follow-up measures at the appropriate legislative and administrative level of each country (and at several levels in federal states). CITES implementation illustrates a legal phenomenon known as 'didoublement fonctionnet', in the terms coined by Georges Scelle. 102 Rather than imposing a supranational regulatory mechanism of its own, the regime relies on reciprocal recognition of national regulatory decisions, provided that these are made in accordance with mutually agreed standards. It is then left up to designated national 'Management Authorities' (listed since 1980 in a global CITES Directory, together with their advisory scientific bodies) to operate the system on behalf of the international community. 103 In the case of the European Union, this somewhat schizophrenic role-splitting actually turns into 'ditriplement fonctionneC for Management Authorities implementing a national law implementing the EU regulations implementing CITES. 104 The enactment of national laws for this purpose, and the empowerment of suitable national administrative agencies to enforce them is thus a crucial first step in 'making CITES work'. 105 Given the diversity of national legal systems and administrative traditions, there is no single uniform 'model law' suitable for CITES implementation in all countries. Instead, a set of 'guidelines for legislation', based on a comparison of state practice, has been issued as an implementation aid by the IUCN Environmental Law Centre since 1981. l06 In order to evaluate the adequacy of implementation by the parties, the CITES Conference in 1992 defined the necessary minimum of domestic measures as comprising 'the authority to (i) designate at least one Management Authority and one Scientific Authority; (ii) prohibit trade in specimens in violation of the Convention; (iii) penalize such trade; and (iv) confiscate specimens illegally traded or possessed'. 107 As it turned out, even that minimum was a tall order for most countries. A survey of eighty-one CITES parties, carried out by the IUCN Environmental Law Centre in 1993-94, indicated that only twelve of the countries surveyed had completed the full range of legislative and administrative measures needed to give effect to all aspects of the Convention and related resolutions and decisions of the Conference of the Parties. Legislation in at least twenty-six countries was found not to meet the four minimum requirements set by the Conference. Moreover, legislation in forty-three other countries was considered incomplete or deficient in some specific aspects, 108 for instance, as regards regulation of trade in wild plants. 109 The twenty-six serious 'laggards' in the second category were notified that the next Conference would consider sanctions, including trade bans, against all parties that had not introduced (i.e., at least submitted to their legislature) the necessary regulatory measures by the time of the meeting in June 1997.
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B. Reporting and Monitoring
Information on the actual administrative performance of CUES member states in implementing the Convention is available from two main sources: (a) annual and biennial self-reporting by the parties on their national trade data and enforcement measures under article Vm(7); and (b) compliance monitoring by the secretariat under article XIII.
With regard to national reporting,"' the record is mixed. At the 1994 Conference, over 30 per cent of the parties were identified as having failed to submit their annual reports in time."
2 Actually, the CITES reporting rate has improved over the years, and is currently better than that of several other global environmental treaties. 113 Even the incomplete trade data received since 1975 enabled the secretariat to undertake export/import correlations which in a number of cases led to the discovery and closure of loopholes and illegal trade transactions. 114 The amount of CITES data now processed by the Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit in Cambridge has rapidly increased (since 1986, about 200,000 trade records annually), to the point where in 1993 they were transferred to an Internet-accessible computer data- sure, however, and as a result of meticulous editing and corroboration, the secretariat's 'Infraction Reports' have come to be accepted as a reliable and impartial instrument for reinforcing national implementation and accountability. 121 Governments also began to realize the potential of CITES as a source of positive media attention ('success stories' as legitimation for national efforts in support of the regime), 122 especially for host countries of the biennial Conferences of the Parties. Indeed, governments have been known to make concessions on substantive treaty issues in order to secure the meeting venue. It has long been recognized that most implementation gaps of environmental regimes are not the result of any premeditated violation of treaty obligations, but rather of institutional and financial constraints, especially in the Third World. 133 A specific example was the case of Bolivia, where persistent non-compliance with CITES permit requirements led to the adoption of a Conference Resolution at the Buenos Aires meeting on 30' April 1985. The resolution recommended that all parties refuse to accept shipments of CITES specimens accompanied by Bolivian documents, or of specimens declared as originating from Bolivia, 'if within 90 days the government of Bolivia had not demonstrated to the Standing Committee that it had adopted all necessary measures to adequately implement the Convention'. 134 After the government responded that it simply lacked the technical expertise to ensure proper export licensing, a group of CITES importing countries and the European Community offered to provide assistance for a training programme, and in November 1985 the Standing Committee recommended suspending the embargo. 135 'Capacity-building' training seminars for officials from CITES Management Authorities and enforcement services in developing countries have since been organized on an ongoing basis, with funding from the regular CITES budget and from extra-budgetary contributions. 136 Liaison has also been established with the World Customs Organization to harmonize procedures and training materials regarding trade in wildlife and wildlife products, and with the INTERPOL Working Party on Environmental Crime (Sub-Group on Wildlife Crime) in order to coordinate training for police officers in charge of combatting illegal trade. 137 However, compliance also requires behavioural changes in wildlife consuming countries. Programmes of public education and persuasion are of vital importance, in particular for tourists (as potential buyers of wildlife souvenirs) 138 and traders.
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For as long as bribes paid to foreign officials remain fully tax-deductible in Belgium, Germany, Greece and Luxembourg, 140 it seems unrealistic to expect that wildlife traders will not flout CITES restrictions in other countries when the opportunity arises.
D. Environmental Impact
After two decades, the jury is still out on CITES, and the ongoing effectiveness survey will give the parties an opportunity to articulate their verdict at the 1997 Conference. The views of commentators vary, although most are favourable. These include the loss of important statistical data on trade flows, 163 the automatic mutual recognition given to permits from other EU countries (making enforcement dependent on the weakest link), 164 and the lack of EU-wide wildlife control and inspection services to replace the former national border controls. 165 A comprehensive revision of the 1982 regulations is scheduled to enter into force on 1 June 1997. While undoubtedly an improvement, this revision, which took the EU five years to prepare, 166 still fails to come to grips with these problems.
A second major challenge is the role of CITES in limiting unsustainable exploitation of species that remain outside its ambit because they fall within the regulatory competence of some other resource management regime or under the dogma of permanent national sovereignty over natural resources. 167 The issue came to the forefront with Dutch and German proposals at the 1992 and 1994 CITES Conferences to list commercially used tropical timber species such as ramin (Gonystylus bancanus) and mahogany in Appendix II, against predictable resistance from some range states (especially Malaysia, Brazil, Cameroon and Congo, which insisted on prior approval by the International Tropical Timber Organization). 168 Still, a total of fifteen timber or 'woody' species have been placed in the appendices to date. 169 For instance, big-leafed mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla), which in 1994 missed the required two-thirds majority for Appendix II by six votes in a secret ballot, was eventually listed in Appendix III by Costa Rica. 170 A temporary Timber Working Group, established by the Conference, will submit proposed new procedures for the listing of timber species to the 1997 meeting, including on consultation with other international bodies in this sector. 171 The other explosive issue to resurface in 1997 may be ocean fisheries. While CITES amendments concerning marine species require consultations with 'intergovernmental bodies having a function in relation to those species' (article XV/2/b), relations with the International Whaling Commission, for one, have not always been easy. 172 After an only half-facetious suggestion by African countries during the 1989 Conference to list the North Atlantic herring in retaliation for elephant up-listing proposals, and after the last-minute withdrawal of a Swedish proposal for the listing of Atlantic bluefin tuna in 1992, 173 the 1994 Conference for the first time discussed shark fisheries and trade in shark fins -despite objections by Japan and other countries,' which would have preferred to leave unlisted marine species to regulation by international fisheries agreements. 174 The issue is indeed reminiscent of negotiations for the 1979 Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals. There, the inclusion of marine living resources was vehemently opposed by an 'alliance of Pacific powers', 175 from whose subsequent boycott that Convention never quite recovered. With the current price of Atlantic bluefin on the sashimi market well above $50 per kilogram, 176 the CITES listing of endangered fish species is bound to be politically controversial. At any rate, the future development of CITES will be determined not only by reference to the ongoing 'trade vs. environment' debate in the World Trade Organization (WTO), 177 but also by growing regulatory competition from 
